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To Know the Place for the First Time:
The Ethical Ownership of Life and Death
Joe Velaidum 
Department of Religious Studies
University of Prince Edward Island
What we call the beginning is often the end
And to make an end is to make a beginning.
The end is where we start from …
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
– T.S. Eliot (Four Quartets V, Little Gidding)
Metaphors of war are often, and rightfully, applied to controversies
that have recently raged over the ownership of skeletal remains.
Frequently, these sorts of oppositions lead to a barricading of beliefs
as attempts are made to secure the fortress of opinion against the
barrage of invading ideas. More positively, these controversies and
their accompanying disagreements can also provide unparalleled
opportunities to understand more fully the presuppositions inherent
in the opinions expressed. The underlying premises of convictions
are most often met only when they are called into question. 
In this paper I will explore one of these underlying ideas, the idea
of “ownership” in the debates surrounding the repatriation of skeletal
remains, such as the recent case of the St. James Cathedral in Toronto
and the famous Kennewick Man case.1 By looking at what
fundamental ideas underlie the types of arguments used to determine
the rightful place of these remains, some of the more damaging
assumptions of the term “ownership” will be uncovered, and a more
profitable method for adjudicating these disputes may be discerned.
It will be made apparent, though not overt, that the humane way of
approaching such cases must take into account the inescapable
framework that Christianity has provided for our current conceptions
of what it means to be human. In public debates, where “Christian”
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arguments are frequently dismissed simply because of their overt
orientation and not because of their content, one must tread carefully
between uncovering the theological roots of the issue if a secular
audience is to be convinced. 
This essay is thus an attempt to clear away much of the dangerous
and unfruitful ideas that lay hidden from the disputes themselves, but
nevertheless provide the assumptions upon which they are based. In
this way the end of my discussion will hopefully lead to a new
beginning for a more genuine dialogue. The paradox, as T.S. Eliot
helps illustrate, is that the end of the current discussion, specifically
uncovering its hidden presuppositions, forms the beginning of my
discussion. It is the end where we start from. 
Disputes, being the result conflicting world-views, are
inextricably bound to principles that are more fundamental than the
disputes themselves. Arguments and debates develop complex and
nuanced forms, but their theoretical foundation quite often hinge on
a few hidden basic principles. Bertrand Russell makes this point in
the introduction of his exploration of Aristotle’s Physics when he
states that “every philosopher, in addition to the formal system which
he offers to the world, has another, much simpler, of which he may
be quite unaware.”2 His colleague Alfred North Whitehead calls this
“the secret imaginative background” of ideas.3
What is suggested here is that not only disputes, but all ideas are
composed of basic assumptions that are not part of the idea itself and
yet form the worldview out of which ideas emerge. A scientist
working in a laboratory and looking for a cure for a certain type of
cancer, for example, carries a great number of assumptions about the
nature of reality and disease, the truth of science and its methodology,
the meaning of scientific progress etc. These ideas are not overtly
present in scientific work and scientists may never think about them,
but they provide the context for their work and its reception by their
peers (who most likely have the same set of basic assumptions). In
saying this, of course, we are not reducing all ideas to more simple
formulaic presuppositions, but rather identifying the place where
thought, out of necessity, must stake its ground in order to begin. 
All ideas are to varying degrees thus comprised of what I like to
term “included-excluded assumptions.” By this I mean that ideas
include the shared cultural and intellectual traditions out of which
authors are inevitably entrenched, but that these are overtly excluded
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from the formulation of the idea itself. Included-excluded ideas attain
their status through their ability to be fruitful as a guiding world-view
through which meaningful results can be produced.4 They have
attained this status through their ability to be fruitful as a guiding
world-view through which meaningful results have been produced. In
this way these assumptions are tried and true, tested by time and
proven so that they gain a level of truth-status. It is only when ideas
are thus considered that they have an opportunity of becoming
included-excluded assumptions. 
An example here will help illustrate. There can be no doubt that
the theory and philosophy of scientific method is an included-
excluded assumption for the vast majority of scientists. When
scientists do not receive the results they expect, they generally do not
call into question the nature of the scientific enterprise, or the
experimental method itself. The problem is considered within the
assumptions of their scientific training. The reason for this is that
these assumptions have provided years of good results. Until there
comes a point when the results are consistently poor, there is no
reason to examine included-excluded assumptions, and there are
many good reasons to leave them alone. 
It is relatively easy to uncover long outmoded included-excluded
assumptions, but it is much more difficult to see our own. We can
understand the (incorrect) assumptions underlying the idea of slavery
or the Ptolemaic universe because the results these assumptions
produced eventually became problematic and their truth-status had to
be investigated. We have a much harder time identifying our own
presuppositions because they are still operative within our thought
processes and therefore harder to ascertain. When our own
presuppositions do not give us our expected results, however
difficult, they too will be called into question. 
Such is the case with the determination of ancient remains. The
Kennewick Man and St. James controversies simply highlight
something that many ethically sensitive people have long known. The
results of debates like these are consistently poor for all parties
concerned, and we need to look more carefully at the included-
excluded ideas we have been working with. In terms of the debates
surrounding the ownership of dead bodies, the presupposition that
needs careful attention is the word “ownership” itself and its
implication in “rights.” The Western idea of ownership has come to
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be indelibly, and for the most part unconsciously, associated with
one’s rights over a given object, becoming intellectually de rigueur
for Western and many non-Western societies. Some natives believe
they have the legal and religious right to repatriate skeletal remains
that belong to their ancestors5 and many scientists and modern
Westerners believe that the interests of scientific truth should be
factored into ascertaining the ownership of such remains. Ultimately,
the Government holds the right to ascertain ownership using official
judicial means. It is, furthermore, usually within the official
structures of ownership (official treaties and legal procedures) that all
parties involved plead their cases. 
The included-excluded idea at work in these disputes, then, has
to do with rights as a product of ownership. Our focus in the
following sections deals with the inadequacies of this assumption for
dealing with humans, and the troubles it has created in adjudicating
disputes over human remains.
The Ownership of Inanimate and Non-Human Objects
The idea of ownership in modern Western society generally connotes
a legal category. The degree to which ownership can be determined
reflects the precision and technicalities of our laws and their binding
adjudication. This legal determination of ownership works well for
objectified, inanimate objects. For obvious reasons, it is relatively
easy to determine the owner of objects; there can be no doubt that I
own the computer that I used to type this essay because I have a bill
of receipt that proves that I have legally purchased it from an
authorized dealer and have paid the requisite taxes to the government. 
Even with the inherent Western ethos that undoubtedly pervades
and is reflected in the legal system itself, difficult cases where
religious and cultural issues are at stake in determining the ownership
of inanimate objects have been continuously settled by legal contracts
and rulings. For example, the first modern land claim settlement in
Canada, “The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (1975)”6
resulted from the perceived violation of the 1912 agreement whereby
native lands were transferred to the Province of Quebec in return for
recognition of the rights of native inhabitants on the land. With the
unilateral establishment of the James Bay Development Corporation
in 1971, native peoples rightfully felt that a violation had occurred.
They initially succeeded in legally ceasing construction of the James
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Bay project but the ruling was shortly overturned and construction
continued. Through arduous negotiations a new document, the
“James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement,” was developed in
1975 and construction continued.7
This case is submitted here because it reveals the relationship
between religious/cultural ideas and legality in determining
ownership of inanimate objects. More specifically, non-human things
can be viewed as “objects” that are used by humans, even when the
surface meaning seems to indicate otherwise. Significantly, the native
Cree inhabitants of the James Bay region do not believe that land
constitutes an “inanimate” object. The characteristics of the land are
very much like the characteristics of a human being for the Cree, and
therefore the land is in fact imbued with a personality that resists the
simple objectification that the modern Western Judeo-Christian view
of nature presupposes.8
However, although there are different religious, cultural and
economic motives that foster different views of the land, it was possible
for the Cree, the federal government of Canada, the provincial
government of Quebec, and the James Bay Development Corporation
(the signatories of the aforementioned agreement in 1975), to finalize a
legal settlement. The Grand Council of Crees ultimately determined
that the continuation of Cree religion and culture must be maintained,
even at the price of sacrificing some land. Here is Chief Billy Diamond,
one of the major figures in the negotiations:
The Cree People were very reluctant to sign an Agreement in
Principle. However, after many meetings and many hours of
meetings, the Grand Council of the Crees has received a mandate to
sign an Agreement in Principle with the Quebec Government.... We
feel, as Cree People, that by coming to an Agreement in Principle,
that it is the best way to see that our rights and that our land are
protected as much as possible from white man’s intrusion and white
man’s use. We have always said that we wanted to maintain our way
of life. We have always said that we want to pass the land on to our
children.… We believe that even though we practised the traditional
way of life, the aboriginal way of life, we believe this agreement
supports and strengthens the hunting, fishing and trapping rights
in/over all of the territory, and restricts non-Native activity in that
area. By the proposed agreement, we feel we have removed the
worst effects of the Project to our way of life and the Cree People.…
I hope you can all understand our feelings, that it has been a tough
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fight, and our people are still very much opposed to the project, but
they realize that they must share the resources. That is why we have
come to a decision to sign an Agreement in Principle with the
Quebec Government.9
Human interests took precedence over land in this case.
Specifically, land was viewed as a symbol for the continuation of a
certain lifestyle. In signing the document in 1975 and in ratifying it
in 2002, the Cree essentially believed that their lifestyle could be
maintained even with the development James Bay, while the larger
capitalist interests believed that their profitability could also be
maintained if they agreed to some of the demands of the natives.
Land, being something that can be bargained in order to achieve
desired results, is here objectified in both cases. Therefore, even in
this case which is wrought with religious and cultural implications,
the legal system is able to determine ownership of the land because it
was in some sense viewed as an inanimate object that could be
negotiated in this dispute.
It is not only the ownership of objectified inanimate objects that
are adequately determined by our judicial system. The ownership of
a pet animal, for example, is even more easily determined by these
means. While very few people would claim that a living animal
should be compared to an inanimate object, our laws nevertheless
apply very similar standards in determining the legal ownership of
animals as it does with inanimate objects. In fact, not only the
determination, but also the practical power hierarchy within this
relationship reveals that ownership is a good model for the
relationship between non-human living things and humans. A good
pet is one that is obedient to human commands and does not follow
its own free choice (which is usually instinctual). That is, in the same
way that objects are used for human concerns and are therefore
objectified, other living things are also viewed in terms of their utility
for humans and are also objectified. Therefore, the legal
determination of ownership has been applicable for both animate and
inanimate objects. 
The legal determination of ownership as just described also
provides the criteria by which any given object can be utilized by its
owner. I can “own” a dog, but I am rightfully not permitted by law to
torture the animal or use it in any way that I please. I can own a gun,
but I can understandably only utilize it under certain prescribed
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limits. Ownership therefore does not imply a carte blanche in terms
of how the object may be utilized, but rather provides the
determination of who may rightfully, which in these cases means
legally, use the object in accordance with the law. 
The Ownership of Humans
Although legal determination of ownership can be applied to objects
that are living or non-living, this same method is inadequate when
dealing with humans, and the failure to recognize this difference
significantly contributes to the unsatisfactory nature of the disputes
over skeletal remains.
Take, for instance, the case of children. In some ways a legal
determination of ownership can be applied here. That is, a child has a
legal parent or guardian and, since the rise of divorce, courts have had
to establish legal precedents for determining a child’s rightful
caregiver. Of course, as in the case of any object as discussed earlier,
this legal determination does not imply that the legal guardian or parent
has the right to treat the child in any manner they wish. The legal
system is, then, equipped to determine the rightful place of children.
However, the legal determination of a child’s belonging also
contains within its language the seeds for the idea that humans
constitute a different legal category than other living or non-living
objects. The words “parent” or “guardian” connote something far
different than an “owner” of land or even a household pet. The best
models for good parenting (in Western society at least), as every good
parent knows, sees that a child is raised with love and care so that
they will eventually be able to make good choices as an adult. We
freely give of ourselves to protect and love our children so that they
will eventually learn to grow into the responsibilities inherent in the
human right to be free and autonomous, and in turn learn to freely
give love to their loved-ones. A parent or guardian thus protects and
nurtures the child in the interest of the autonomy and freedom of the
child and not out of unabashed self-interest. 
The legal determination of a parent or guardian is, then, much
different than the legal determination of other living or non-livings
things. This is obvious in cases where inanimate objects are “owned”
in order to benefit the owner. In the case of other living things, pets
for example, the point is less obvious but nevertheless the same.
Quite often, many owners of pets claim that they are more like
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“parents.” This no doubt reflects the owner’s refusal to objectify their
pet, treating it rather as a living thing that needs to be nurtured. The
analogy between owner/pet and parent/child is however is
inadequate. Given the model of parenting that sees the end product as
the development of a free and autonomous individual who is able to
make decisions for themselves, we can see that a human-pet
relationship cannot be a good “parenting” model. The owner of a pet
provides care and expects obedience, and the end result of this
relationship apart from any anthropocentric ideas of love, is
obedience. If a dog starts to “think” for himself, he is usually
considered a hazard and is “put-down,” if a child thinks for herself we
hope the parents have a good University savings plan, as she will one
day become a leader of society. The care of a pet is ultimately done
with the owner in mind, not the freedom of the pet. 
Humans are therefore not “owned” in the same way as any other
living or non-living thing. If this was not the case, and humans
constituted the same category of “ownership” as other objects, then
there would be very little ethical argumentation against slavery. At its
base, slavery is abhorrent because we believe that humans cannot be
owned in the way that any other object can. We do not own humans but
we can be entrusted with them. This change in perspective is what is
desperately needed in our current mindset about determining the rightful
place of skeletal remains and leads to a conception of humane ethical
discourse that is far more meaningful than one based on “ownership.”
Entrustment of Humans as a Special Ethical Category
The special ethical status afforded to humans has a long lineage in
Western intellectual and religious thought. Its origins are found in the
most dominant mythology that shapes the modern Western
orientation to nature and humanity’s place in it: the myth of the fall
found in Genesis 1-3. The story we all know well enough, but it is its
legacy on the Western mind that is most applicable here. The legacy
of Genesis is the relatively simple idea that has had a complex and
powerful force on Western thought: we are both created in the image
of God and therefore somewhat separated and different from nature,
but since we are fallen we are also part of nature as well. We are
caught in the middle between our animal nature and our divine
likeness. Since one of the results of the fall was freedom of the will
(modern terminology prefers the term “freedom of choice”) we are
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free to relate to our animal nature or to our divine likeness. The
history of Western thought shows that we have decisively chosen the
latter. Even when the religious underpinnings of this orientation are
removed, as it is for much of modern secular society, this
fundamental cosmological and anthropological orientation remains.
The reason it remains does not originate solely out of obsessive
ideas about our own self-importance. There is a very practical
statement at work in this orientation as well. The bare fact that,
regardless of religion or culture and in all historical epochs, humans
out of necessity have shaped the natural world in order to survive is
perhaps the main reason humans deem human life to be distinct from
all others. Wendell Berry, a leading advocate for ecological
awareness, writes:
Pure nature, anyhow, is not good for humans to live in, and humans
do not want to live in it – or not for very long. Any exposure to the
elements that lasts more than a few hours will remind us of the
desirability of the basic human amenities: clothing, shelter, cooked
food, the company of kinfolk and friends – perhaps even of hot baths
and music and books.10
By human standards the natural world is unbearably cruel and
does not contain any discernable morality or ethics – instincts reign
supreme. If humans base their society on this model, the results are
cruelty and hatred (Social Darwinism, for example). Civilization is a
constant fight against the barbarism (from a human point of view) we
see in nature. As Northrop Frye, following William Blake, has
continuously argued, nature offers the necessary raw materials
needed to overcome the bare necessities of existence to which
animals are a slave: we use the land to create gardens and farms; we
derive electricity from water and sun; we are not content with mere
sustenance, but want cuisine; we are not content with shelter, but
want a home; we are not content with sex, but want love. These are
specifically human creations, and they are so imbedded in us that we
usually forget that they are creations, created out of the combination
of our needs and wants. The “real world” for humans is a world
created by humans that separates us from the natural world.11
Of course this separation does not inherently imply the
domination of nature, since there is obviously a symbiotic
relationship between human culture and the natural world. The
degree of symbiosis depends on specific individual and cultural
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norms, and Western culture has historically failed to understand this
symbiosis. Nevertheless, the point here, to quote Berry once again, is
that “so long at least as humans are in the world, in human culture is
the preservation of wilderness.”12 This leads to the inescapable
framework for the special ethical status afforded to humans. In our
separation from nature to create human culture, we have consciously
created for ourselves a distinct world for human culture, and with it a
distinct category for ethical discourse.
Ownership is an inadequate language when dealing with humans
because it reflects a detached and objectified power relationship. We
can own land or even a pet but we do not own humans because a
transformation of the “I” into an “It,” in Martin Buber’s famous
formulation, betrays the separation of human culture from nature and
makes humans into objects. Earlier we stated that ownership implies
that one has the rightful use of an object, and this model can now be
seen as inadequate because our ethical codes constantly reinforce the
idea that humans are not meant to be “used” by others. Charles Taylor
has persuasively argued that the dominance of instrumental reason in
our decision-making processes and its accompanying idea of
“efficiency” as the sole criteria for measuring success has left the
essentially dialogical nature of our human relationships inarticulate
for much of modern society.13 It is not efficient to fall in love, to have
children, to do volunteer work or to have dinner with your friends.
Yet these things are obviously not a waste of time either. They are
expressions of our belief that it is not only with but also through our
relationships with other humans that we find our humanity. The
connection between ownership and rights, applicable as it is for all
other interactions, fails us at the most fundamental human level
because it objectifies people.
However, when the humans we are dealing with are dead, this
inadequate language for human life is frequently thought to be
appropriate (if only unconsciously as an included-excluded idea) and
human bodies are treated as objects in public discourse. The question
before us now is if this is an appropriate vehicle to discuss where
skeletal remains belong.
Dead Bodies as a Special Ethical Category
The theoretical foundation for rejecting a detached and objectified
language of ownership when dealing with dead human remains and
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establishing a more humane and engaged language is found in the
idea that the wishes of the dead should be honoured. 
The objectification of dead bodies is undoubtedly the result of the
modern scientific definition of life. As fluid as it is in the case of the
exact point where human life begins, modern science is unyielding in
its definition of when life ends. This orientation has of course been
required since objectification of dead bodies has become necessary in
the advancement of knowledge. Ethically, it is only possible to probe
a body if there is at least an implicit idea that the body is no longer
part of life. In this way, then, dead bodies are objectified and a
language of ownership may then be profitably applied. Frequently,
however, the use of one’s body after death still requires prior
permission of the deceased, and this singular fact highlights the
tension in our view of dead bodies. A scientific community requires
the objectification of dead bodies in order to do their work, but the
respect for the wishes of the dead still plays a major role in
determining how the body will be used. If the body is no longer part
of life and can thus be objectified, then what justifiable claims do the
deceased have? Why do we, and more importantly, why should we
respect the wishes of the dead?
Aside from the various religious and cultural implications of the
answer, a significant principle we have already discussed can be brought
to bear in this discussion. The reason humans treat human life in a way
that is different from any other living or non-living object, as we have
seen, is because it reflects our sense that humans should not be
objectified. This too can be extended to human remains as well. The
underlying ethos of all our ethical codes is that humans must build a
system of belief and action that transcends mere instinct – we are
different from any other form of life on earth, and must create a world
based on this distinction. Regardless of the ethical codes we create, this
inevitable fact remains. In the same way, an ethical code for dead bodies
(regardless of how an individual or their culture defines “appropriate”
means of dealing with them) should also reflect reverence for humanity.
That is, since our actions towards other humans is part of the creation of
culture, and the creation of culture stems from our need to separate
ourselves from the rest of nature in order to find our humanity, it can
then be rightfully argued (and has been done in numerous occasions)
that our defiance to treat bodies simply as objects is an indication of the
value we place on the uniqueness of human life.
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There are, of course, degrees of objectification. For example, in
November 2000, the historic St. James Cathedral in Toronto proposed
to close a portion of the former Burying Ground located on its site in
order to rebuild the Parish House. Old burials would be documented
and re-interred in St. James’ Cemetery. St. James’ Cemetery was
established in 1844 to replace the old burial ground. The first re-
burials from the old churchyard Burying Ground were made there
more than 150 years ago. Theologically, this move is unquestionably
valid. There is no violation of religious doctrine, as long as the dead
bodies are respected in the removal and reburying processes (even the
body of Pope John XXIII was moved). 
But theology is not the only argument that comes into play in this
dispute. A vocal opponent to the Church is “Heritage Toronto.” They
filed an objection to the Cathedral Corporation’s application with the
Ontario Registrar. They believe that that the renovations and even
possible plans to develop a condominium on the site will alter the
historical value of the site. Some family members of those buried on
these lands, additionally, feel that their loved ones should be left at rest.
I do not intend here to settle this matter, but I do want to show the types
of questions that must be asked if we are to not objectify these remains.
First, who is entrusted with the bodies? In this case it is the
Church, who is bound by its conscience and guided by doctrine and
tradition. The deceased have decided to be buried on a Christian
burial plot, and have therefore entrusted their remains to the dictates
of Christian protocol. Questions of historical preservation or
genealogy, while having general validity and importance, have no
specific value in establishing who the bodies have been entrusted to. 
Second, is the entrustment of the body being violated? That is, are
the fundamental principles of those entrusted with the remains being
violated? This discussion can only be carried forward internally by
the Church. 
And third, are there any other options? 
This case is significant because more than any other recent issue,
it highlights the main ethical component of dealing with dead bodies.
When entrusted with the care of a body, one must take seriously the
underlying ethos, formulated as – obeying the wishes of the deceased
is not only an expression of their wishes, but is a symbol for the value
of our humanity. The value of the individual’s humanity must come
first, which means primarily denying their objectification. The main
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question in dealing with the dead is, then, is not who owns the body,
but rather who is entrusted with the remains. This is easily
ascertained for the most part, but it is the exceptional case which tests
the ethical code I have been advocating. When the body is of
significant historical import, as is the case with Kennewick Man, the
scientist might claim that these bodies must be utilized for some
greater goal such as scientific truth, or historical preservation, or
human knowledge. In developing an ethics of the dead, are these not
valuable arguments? Are these not the seeds upon which our great
modern world is based? Don’t these ends justify the means, thereby
also justifying the utilization of these bodies regardless of how the
deceased may have wished?
Isaiah Berlin, one of the wisest and most practical voices of the
twentieth century, provides insight into such cases. Following
Alexander Herzen, Berlin states that modernity has developed a new
form of sacrifice that emphasizes human sacrifice on the altars of
abstractions – the “nation, Church, party, class, progress, the forces of
history” to which I would like to add “scientific progress and
scientific truth.” He goes on to say:
The one thing that we may be sure of is the reality of the sacrifice,
the dying and the dead. But the ideal for the sake of which they die
remains unrealised. The eggs are broken, and the habit of breaking
them grows, but the omelette remains invisible.14
Distant goals are not by themselves enough reason to dishonor
the value of human life. In fact, the idea that scientific or historical
truths are ends in themselves is a radical misunderstanding of the
nature of any intellectual enterprise. 
Intellectual constructs are bodies of knowledge that attempt to
give a better human understanding (which usually means unity) to
what is currently unstructured and disunited. One does not study
nature, but rather the human intellectual construct called physics or
biology. One does not study random events of the past, but rather
shapes those events in a human understanding called history. All
academic endeavours and intellectual pursuits are attempts to give a
human understanding and even sometimes control (in the best sense
of the word) to what is presently unknown or little understood. They
are guided by our notion that as humans we should be able to have
some control over reality unlike other animals which are at the whim
of natural forces. They are guided by the idea that we can create
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reality to be more humane with the power of our human
understanding. Creating unity out of disorder is a specifically human
enterprise that aims to show our human-ness and the power of our
mind is an integral part of this. 
By disrespecting human life while pursuing these tremendously
important fields, we forget that the truth to which science and history
and archaeology point are truths that are meant to uphold the dignity
of our humanity. They are not intended and they are not created to
degrade it. By disrespecting the wishes of the dead or those entrusted
with their bodies we are showing our devaluation of life for some
distant goal, like abstract truth that is divorced from its human
component. To invert Berlin’s formula, we might begin to see the
omelet, but there will be fewer and fewer eggs to make them with,
and even fewer people to enjoy the breakfast feast. Only when the
entrustment of remains cannot be reasonably established should we
be willing to sacrifice the individual on the altar of an abstraction.
Moreover, in these cases we do so advisedly, knowing that we have
taken something of that individual’s humanity away, and lamenting
that our knowledge comes at such a great cost.
Such thinking reflects the central idea I have been pursuing. In
realising that one cannot own a human body (living or dead), but we
can be “entrusted” with it and in respecting what the word entrusted
means, we are showing our reverence for human life. Additionally, in
the utilization of instrumental reason to establish the rightful
ownership of dead bodies, the ends to which reason aspires are
already established as valid. If we turn our attention to the ends
themselves I believe a more humane question emerges. Such a focus
changes the question from “where does a body rightfully belong” to
“does a body rightfully belong?” In the first question, reason is used
instrumentally to achieve a most efficient and objective answer, in the
second the answer is forestalled because the question itself is being
scrutinized. This conclusion is where the new beginning for this
question may emerge and if we are successful in this pursuit may we
come again to know the place for the first time.
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